



UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI  
DI TRENTO

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DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION ENGINEERING AND COMPUTER  
SCIENCE

ICT International Doctoral School

SCALABLE SAFETY AND RELIABILITY  
ANALYSIS VIA SYMBOLIC  
MODEL CHECKING:  
THEORY AND APPLICATIONS

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SCIENCE

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# Abstract

*Assuring safety and reliability is fundamental when developing a safety critical system. Road, naval and avionic transportation; water and gas distribution; nuclear, eolic, and photovoltaic energy production are only some examples where it is mandatory to guarantee those properties. The continuous increasing in the design complexity of safety critical system calls for a never ending sought of new and more advanced analytical techniques. In fact, they are required to assure that undesired consequences are highly improbable.*

*In this Thesis we introduce a novel methodology able to raise the bar in the area of automated safety and reliability analysis. The proposed approach integrates a series of techniques, based on symbolic model checking, into the current development process of safety critical systems. Moreover, our methodology and the resulting techniques are thereafter applied to a series of real-world case studies, developed in collaboration with authoritative entities such as NASA and the Boeing Company.*

## **Keywords**

[Model-Based Safety Assessment, Symbolic Model Checking, Safety Assessment, Reliability Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, Contract-Based Design, Minimal Cutsets]



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# List of Acronyms

<b>ATC</b>	Air Traffic Control
<b>BDD</b>	Binary Decision Diagram
<b>CBD</b>	Contract-Based Design
<b>CBSA</b>	Contract-Based Safety Assessment
<b>CD&amp;R</b>	Conflict Detection and Resolution
<b>CS</b>	Cutset
<b>CTL</b>	Computational Tree Logic
<b>DAG</b>	Directed Acyclic Graph
<b>DMR</b>	Double Modular Redundancy
<b>FBW</b>	Fly-by-Wire
<b>FDIR</b>	Fault Detection Identification and Recovery
<b>FMEA</b>	Fault Mode and Effects Analysis
<b>FTA</b>	Fault Tree Analysis
<b>GSEP</b>	Ground Separated Aircraft
<b>IC3</b>	Incremental Construction of Inductive Clauses for Indubitable Correctness
<b>LTL</b>	Linear Temporal Logic
<b>MBSA</b>	Model-Based Safety Assessment
<b>MEA</b>	More Electric Airplane

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<b>MCS</b>	Minimal Cutsets
<b>PDR</b>	Property Directed Reachability
<b>SMT</b>	Satisfiability Modulo Theory
<b>SSEP</b>	Self Separated Aircraft
<b>TMR</b>	Triple Modular Redundancy
<b>V&amp;V</b>	Validation and Verification
<b>WBS</b>	Wheel Braking System

# 1

## Introduction

*If a machine is expected to be infallible,  
it cannot also be intelligent.*

– Alan Turing

It is the 1906, and Lee de Forest invents the vacuum tube and makes way for the active electronics. 30 years later, this result had a huge impact in WWII which pushed on this technology and initiated the electronic revolution. Colossus, the world's first programmable computer, was one of the most important application of such technology, but in this Thesis we refer to this period for a different reason: the emerging of safety and reliability engineering.

Electronic researches during WWII contributed in the development of technological applications such as radio, radar, and television. At the same time, the vacuum tubes were also the main cause of equipment failure, in fact they required to be replaced five times more often than all other equipments. This recurring issue required to investigate on the definition of specific analysis, able to attribute the cause of such unreliability of the electrical components. In a general perspective, the term reliability attributes to the system capability of behaving in accordance with its prescribed functionality, in fact a failure of a vacuum tube in an electrical

## 1. INTRODUCTION

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device can cause the entire system not to working property. Differently, system safety is the property of not causing damage, risk, or injury. After WWII, specific studies in this direction arose from the necessity to deal with the increasing level of complexity in military aircraft and ballistic missile systems.

Over the years, the vacuum tubes were replaced by transistors, and their successive miniaturization has allowed for the increasing in system capability and complexity. In parallel to this trend, safety and reliability engineering have had to evolve by introducing new and more efficient approaches able to support the design, and avoid unintended behaviors, of such complex systems. In the current era, the problem of assuring safety and reliability affects the design of systems that are definitely more pervasive than the purely military ones. Most notably areas of application for such disciplines are road, naval and avionic transportation; water and gas distribution; and nuclear, eolic, and photovoltaic energy production. Guaranteeing safety and reliability in these applications is mandatory, thus they are categorized as *safety critical systems*. The process that guides the development of a safety critical system is highly controlled and standardized by the competent authorities. In fact, releasing a certificate of system conformance requires to guarantee that system requirements, defined at the early stages of the development, are fairly derived into the system and sub-systems design, correctly implemented into the production phase, and - finally - that the concrete system implementation is in accordance with sub-systems, system, and the original requirements definition. Each of these phases is characterized by a set of well established analysis and methodology, which guides the system design through an incremental refinement from initial requirements definition to the final system implementation. The resulting process has two parallel flows: one that analyzes the system under normal conditions, and the other that evaluates its robustness in



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presence of components' failure. The former is the system development *V-Model*, and the latter is called *safety assessment*.

Modern safety critical systems have become so complex that their safety cannot be shown solely by test, and whose logic is nearly impossible to comprehend without the aid of analytical tools. The approach that, in the last decades, emerged to cope with such complexity is the use of formal methods. In practice, a system behavior can be defined with a variety of diagrams, textual descriptions, and operational procedures, but in all cases they must be well defined and tailored to avoid ambiguous interpretations. The application of formal methods solves this issue by providing a set of mathematical based techniques that allow the engineer to discharge the possibility of introducing design misinterpretations. Since the resulting formal representation of the system has a unique interpretation, therefore it can be interpreted by a software that allows for automated or semi-automated analysis to discover design flaws, and to validate the result. The introduction of *model checking*, in early 1980s, represented one of the most important achievements in the field of formal methods. In fact, this technique allows for exhaustively and automatically check whether a formal system definition - the model - meets a set of formal requirements. However, while highly promising, model checking required several years to be effectively applied to a real-world scenario and be integrated into a development process.

In the 1990s, the advances of the model-based techniques have received significant interest in the community of safety and reliability engineering. The ensemble of those disciplines is defined as *model-based safety assessment* (MBSA). The objective of this research field is to support the analysis prescribed by the safety assessment process, by relying on the definition of a formal model of the system. In particular, original MBSA techniques [68, 100, 13] were directed to provide a single formalism able to automa-

tize the production of classical safety artifacts such as Fault Trees (FT) and Fault Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) tables. However, those approaches were operating only at the safety assessment level, and the relation with the nominal system analysis (i.e., the V-Model) was not considered.

The successive integration with model checking techniques allowed to reduce this gap [29, 39, 38, 42, 11, 22, 21, 37]. However, the resulting techniques were not directed to natively support the distinctive refinement of the design that characterizes the development of a safety critical system. At the same time, they experience significant issues when dealing with real-world, large scale system designs.

## Contributions

In this Thesis we define a set of comprehensive model-based safety assessment methodologies and techniques able to overcome the limitations of current approaches. The proposed solution provides i) a seamless integration with standard V-Model and safety assessment processes, ii) able to natively follow the characteristic refinement of the system design, iii) by providing advanced and completely automated techniques for assuring system safety and reliability, iv) while guaranteeing the ability to deal with real-world system designs.

This target has been reached by integrating several different techniques into a single framework. The contributions of this Thesis that support these results are the followings:

- In [30] we improve the performance of the minimal cutsets computation, which represents the basis of all model-based safety assessment techniques that rely on symbolic model checking. This result has been possible via the application of modern SAT-based algorithms. Moreover, we widen the level of expressivity supported by the minimal

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cutsets computation, moving from pure invariant definition of system specifications to a full support of Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [102].

- In [35] we encompass an emerging paradigm called contract-based design (CBD) in order to define a novel methodology that natively supports the refinement of system design. In fact, CBD introduces a formal approach to automatically analyze the correctness of system decompositions into a hierarchy of sub-systems and modules.
- We extend current model-based safety assessment methodologies in order to support the reliability analysis of redundant architectures [33]. This approach integrates Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) and minimal cutsets computation in order to support the analysis in the early stages of the system design e.g., when modules implementation have not yet defined. Moreover, in [34] we apply a specialized technique based on model abstraction that significantly improves the performance.
- We implemented all aforementioned techniques into a set of specialized tools such as nuXmv [97], xSAP [27], and OCRA [54], which are engineered in order to support a comprehensive framework that follows the system design by supporting both V-model and safety assessment processes.
- In order to validate the practical applicability of the methodologies introduced in this Thesis, we applied them to a series of real-world case studies. Most notably, the aforementioned approaches are applied in a joint project with the National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA) to formally analyze a series of possible designs for the next generation of the Air Traffic Control system (ATC) [90, 69]. Furthermore, an analysis of the reliability has been applied to the archi-

tectural design of the Primary Flight Computers of the Boeing 777 and Airbus A330. Moreover, we discuss the effectiveness of the proposed approach to produce safety analysis artifacts, by applying it to a case-study described in the Aerospace Information Report [109];

- We provide the whole documentation regarding case studies and tools at the link [www.mattarei.eu/cristian/thesis](http://www.mattarei.eu/cristian/thesis).

### Structure of the Thesis

The rest of this Thesis is organized as follows:

- Part I provides the background notions that identify the starting point of this Thesis. This Part provides an overview of V-Model and safety assessment processes, their integration with formal methods, and a set of formal definitions characterizing the problem that we intend to solve.
- Part II elaborates on the problem of minimal cutsets computation. The first portion describes how to relate nominal design and its extension with failure behaviors. Previous techniques are then discussed, in addition to a set of simple extensions that can be applied to solve this problem. This Part continues with the introduction of novel techniques that define the new state of the art in the minimal cutsets computation. An extensive experimental evaluation is then described, followed by the description of an LTL extension, and future directions.
- Part III describes the integration of safety analysis with contract-based design. In this Part we follow the description of the technique with a running example taken from an avionic standard. Subsequently, we provide a detailed definition of contract-based design, which is then extended into the contract-based safety analysis approach. This Part

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concludes with an experimental evaluation and a discussion on future directions.

- Part IV elaborates on the techniques for the reliability analysis of redundant architectures. Firstly, it provides an overview of the techniques used to increase hardware reliability by the application of components redundancy. Afterwards, we provide the detail of the automated technique based on Satisfiability Modulo Theory, and its subsequent improvement based on predicate abstraction. Experimental evaluations and future directions conclude this Part.
- Part V is devoted at describing the tools architecture that we designed in order to carry out the aforementioned techniques. This Part describes the evolution that have been applied on nuXmv, xSAP, and OCRA tools in order to defined the model-based safety assessment approach described in this Thesis. A discussion on the resulting comprehensive process is then provided.
- Part VI supports the effectiveness of the techniques that we have introduced in this work, by providing the details of their application to a set of real-world case studies. In this Part we first describe the analysis of a triple modular generator, which is a small but representative example to introduce the application of model-based safety assessment. Afterwards, we provide the details of the evaluation of the next generation of the air traffic control system, the analysis of the Fly-by-Wire architectures of two modern aircraft, and an extract of the results reached on the evaluation of an avionic based wheel braking system.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

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